LMAO; That Guy Is Such a &*%#!: Redefining Defamation Law\u27s Stagnant Community Standard in a Rapidly Changing World by Lewis, Daniel
Florida A & M University Law Review
Volume 8




LMAO; That Guy Is Such a &*%#!: Redefining
Defamation Law's Stagnant Community Standard
in a Rapidly Changing World
Daniel Lewis
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.law.famu.edu/famulawreview
Part of the Torts Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ FAMU Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida A & M
University Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons @ FAMU Law. For more information, please contact
linda.barrette@famu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Daniel Lewis, LMAO; That Guy Is Such a &*%#!: Redefining Defamation Law's Stagnant Community Standard in a Rapidly Changing
World, 8 Fla. A&M U. L. Rev. (2012).
Available at: http://commons.law.famu.edu/famulawreview/vol8/iss1/8
"LMAO.. .THAT GUY IS SUCH A &*%#!":
REDEFINING DEFAMATION LAW'S
STAGNANT COMMUNITY STANDARD IN
A RAPIDLY CHANGING WORLD
Daniel Lewis*
"One is a member of a country, a profession, a civilization, a religion.
One is not just a man."
-Antoine de Saint-Exupiryl
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INTRODUCTION
Nearly forty years ago in the heat of the civil rights movement,
the Supreme Court famously considered whether a Montgomery, Ala-
bama Commissioner who supervised the Police Department was
damaged by defamatory comments. In determining whether the false
statements published in the New York Times article lowered the Com-
missioner's reputation and impeded his reelection chances, the court
wrestled with defining the community in which these comments were
* Daniel Lewis is an LL.M. candidate in Environmental and Land Use Law at the
University of Florida. He received his J.D. from Florida A&M University College of Law in
May 2013.
1. Antoine de Saint-Exupdry, Wartime Writings 1939-1944, translated from French
by Norah Purcell, http://www.quotegarden.com/community.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2012).
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published. 2 Should the Supreme Court consider the allegedly defama-
tory comments within the scope of a national community, as the New
York Times is a national publication, or was the correct community
restrained to the registered voters in the Montgomery district upon
whose votes the Commissioner would depend? In between these two
extremes, the court could have considered a community defined by oc-
cupation, such as police officers or government officials, or perhaps
even defined the relevant community in which Sullivan's reputation
suffered harm as the community of white males in Alabama. This de-
termination was all-important to a case which was to become a
lynchpin of defamation case law; defining the community is the crucial
initial step in addressing whether the plaintiff suffered harm, and
therefore whether the statement is defamatory.
The issue facing the court in Sullivan remains. Despite the
speech-based constitutional underpinnings given the tort of defama-
tion by the Supreme Court's holding in Sullivan, four decades later a
plaintiff seeking to prove a defamation action faces the same evalua-
tion. The plaintiff "must still prove, at a minimum: 1) the existence of
a defamatory communication; 2) publication of the communication to a
third party; and 3) identification of a plaintiff to a third party."3 A
statement is considered defamatory if it "tends so to harm the reputa-
tion of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to
deter third persons from associating or dealing with him."4 In the de-
cades since the American Law Institute's Restatement (Second) of
Torts reiterated the existing common law community standard, the
definition of community has become an even more ill-defined and
vague standard as the explosion of alternative communities expands.
Before social media allowed us to join forums, create identities
with likeminded individuals, tweet, post, or text message statements
instantaneously, globally and with little or no filter, the standards of
community were often viewed through a geographic lens. We have, for
better and worse, entered into an interactive world where the World
Wide Web has broken down geographic barriers and communities are
comprised of individuals from faraway places, differing beliefs, who
2. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 260 (1964). Sullivan relied on
testimony of a former employer, who doubted whether he "would want to be associated with
anybody who would be a party to such things that are stated in that ad," and that he would
not re-employ respondent if he believed "that he allowed the Police Department to do the
things that the paper say he did."
3. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Defamation, Reputation and the Myth of Community, 71
wASH L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1996).
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §559 cmt. e (1977).
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often remain behind a veil of anonymity.5 By December 31, 2011, over
2.2 billion users across the globe access and communicate through the
Internet.6 Within a rapidly changing world where communicative me-
diums evolve in a seemingly constant manner, defining community is
an uncertain endeavor, yet a court's definition of community is prereq-
uisite to determining whether or not a statement is defamatory. As
new forms of the community emerge, the definition and standards of a
community change. Clarity and consensus in defining the community
are paramount to effective litigation in the field of defamation.
This note proposes that the current legal system in which
judges must speculate and arbitrarily determine a plaintiffs commu-
nity based on judge's own unconscious beliefs and individualized views,
needs to be reformed. The problems of an arbitrary and unclear com-
munity definition are exacerbated by the rapidly modernizing modes of
communication through which everyday interactions and communica-
tions occur. After first tracing the importance and changing
definitions of community, this work's second section will analyze the
Annenberg Report, the most comprehensive recent work on defamation
reform, and other selected reformation concepts brought forth by schol-
ars. While scholars agree that the current defamation structure is
poor at best, there is no consensus on what direction to proceed. Part
three of this work will weigh and balance the selected reform concepts
previously advanced, and offer new recommendations, such as combin-
ing the 'plaintiff-centered' approach in which the plaintiffs plead and
proves their own community and the 'individualized sub-community'
approach in which particularized communal groups are identified, as
well as an enlarged "choice of law" approach and liberally borrowing
existing obscenity standards. Discussion of these recommendations
will be useful in the community standard reformation process.
I. BACKGROUND: THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMUNITY
"In many ways, reputation is a quintessential public good. We can-
not have a reputation except insofar as it is created in cooperation
with others and relative to our relationships with them."
-David Ardia7
5. David S. Ardia, Reputation in a Networked World: Revisiting the Social
Foundations of Defamation Law, 45 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 261, 262 (2010).
6. World Internet Usage and Population Statistics, at www.internetworldstats.com/
stats.htm (last visited Mar. 15,2012). (citing 2,267,233,742 users on Dec. 31, 2011).
7. Ardia, supra note 5, at 261.
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In David S. Ardia's 2010 work "Reputation in a Networked
World," the above quote illustrates an axiomatic truth regarding defa-
mation: our reputation exists as a product and reflection of our
interpersonal relationships. Taking this proposition to the logical next
step, Ardia points out that when one has his reputation smeared, it
lessens the "value and reliability of this information," and as a result
devalues an individual's "community identity."8 In a modern world,
the importance of community identity is heightened through the per-
manence of our communication. The Internet has made changes that
were impossible for legislatures to have envisioned when defamation
laws were created decades ago. Reputation today is far more perma-
nent than ever before, and information about individuals, both good
and bad, not only exists forever but can be easily accessed by others
within an individual's community.9
Scholar Laura Heymann comments that Ardia's work "is en-
couraging greater attention to community" in online defamation cases,
and postulates that a more complete conception of reputation, there-
fore, should take such community interests into account. 10 Heymann's
theory is that one's reputation is a social concept which springs to life
when the community forms a collective judgment, and that this collec-
tive judgment in turn guides the community's further interactions
towards the individual." This theory implicates the importance com-
munity holds in both shaping an individual's reputation and the
necessity of taking community interests into account within defama-
tion actions. Defamation actions are crucially important, given that
plaintiffs live within communities in which a constructed reputation
acts as a medium for all communal interactions. If false and defama-
tory statements lead to a plaintiff being burdened with inaccurate
reputations within the community, the exchange between members of
the community rests on a false foundation. For defamation to be a via-
ble method of making an injured plaintiff whole, courts need to take
these community interests into account.
The Supreme Court standard established in Peck v. Tribune
Company held that it is sufficient for defamation claims to have in-
jured the plaintiff "in the estimation of a considerable and respectable
8. Id. at 262.
9. John C. Dvorak, The Permanence of Posting Online, PC MAGAZINE (July 1, 2011),
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2387907,00.asp.
10. Laura A. Heymann, The Law of Reputation and the Interest of the Audience, 52 B.
C. L. REV. 1341, 1342 (2011).
11. Id. at 1341.
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class of the community."12 Important in legally defining community,
the court established that a communication need not be defamatory to
the general public, but is only required to injure an individual to an
"important and respectable" portion of the community. 13 Just over two
decades later, the "right-thinking" rule was introduced into the com-
mon law. In Kimmerle v. New York Evening Journal, Inc., the court
stated that a statement is defamatory only if it would expose an indi-
vidual to shame "in the minds of right-thinking persons."14 Ambiguity
surrounds exactly what would constitute such a "right-thinking" per-
son, just as no clear delineation has been proffered by the court as to
how much, or how little, of the populace constitutes a "substantial and
respectable" minority. In a world where new communities arise seem-
ingly overnight, the lack of a defined threshold plagues the tort of
defamation. In the "offline" community, geographic proximity, in-per-
son affiliations and face-to-face interactions mesh together to establish
rough boundaries which define a community. Where can a line be
drawn in an online, networked world, which to a large degree ignores
geography and thrives on anonymity?
Post-Peck jurisprudence has focused upon the three areas of
contention implicated by the fact pattern in Peck - size, geography and
membership in a particular group.15 Of these three, the "membership
in a particular group approach" utilized in Remick v. Manfredy has the
most applicability to online mediums.16 In this case, plaintiff Lloyd
Remick, an attorney specializing in sports entertainment law, brought
a defamation action against boxer Angel Manfredy, his agents, and his
lawyers. The defamation action was premised on a fax sent from Man-
fredy's Indiana firm to Remick's Pennsylvania offices claiming that
Remick was "extorting" money from the boxer. When two of Remick's
employees found the letter on top of the fax machine in his Penn-
sylvania office, the parties argued whether Pennsylvania or Indiana
law should apply. In this case, the court eschewed both size and geo-
graphic restrictions, deciding to define the relevant community as one
12. Elizabeth Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 190 (1909).
13. Id.
14. Kimmerle v. New York Evening Journal, Inc., 186 N.E. 217, 218 (N.Y. 1933).
15. Amy Kristin Sanders, Defining Defamation: Community in the Age of the Internet,
15 COMM. L. &POLY 231, 240-251 (2010). In the decades since Peck, the Supreme Court has
defined community by focusing on the issue of size in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497
U.S. 1 (1990). The court has also focused on geography to determine community - see Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 321 (1974). The Third Circuit recognized community based
on membership in an organization rather than boundaries in Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d
248 (3d Cir. 2001).
16. Id.
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limited to individuals within the boxing community.17 In so doing, the
federal appellate court recognized that false and harmful statements
within a professional sub-community can be the basis for a defamation
action.
The concept of a small sub-community is being increasingly re-
lied upon, as indicated in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 2008
holding in Galustian v. Peter that the "place of the wrong is the place of
publication."18 Here, a resident of the United Arab Emirates ("UAE")
brought a defamation claim against a Virginia citizen, who lived and
worked in Iraq. The claim alleged that the Virginia citizen sent a de-
famatory email about him to members of a non-profit organization,
costing the UAE resident substantial business.19 The Virginia court
applied the "choice-of law" rule, which applies the law of the place of
the wrong on tort claims, holding that the place of publication of alleg-
edly defamatory email is deemed to be the place where the email was
received. In the defamation suit in Galustian, the place of publication
was deemed to be Iraq, the place where the email was received by the
non-profit organization, as opposed to the place where the email was
composed, since it was to this group that the plaintiffs reputational
harm would suffer. An expansion of Virginia's approach to defamatory
actions may serve to reform actions and more accurately embrace com-
munities that send and receive information through social mediums.
II. ANALYSIS OF CONTEMPORARY REFORM EFFORTS
"The community myth is that here is now, or ever has been, a "com-
munity" in the sense of groups of like-minded individuals, living in
urban areas, who share a common heritage, have similar values and
norms, and share a common perception of social order."
-John Crank20
17. Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 249 (3d Cir. 2001). The court did recognize the
harm which could have caused by the statements but in this case the plaintiff failed to
sufficiently show publication of the defamatory materials (and did not prevail).
Nevertheless, the court recognized that a plaintiffs reputation could suffer injury within a
community other than one in which either the plaintiff or the publishing entity resides,
which supports the concept of non-geographically based community. For a good discussion of
this case and the potential effects on the community standards, see Sanders, Defining
Defamation, 250-251 (2010).
18. Galustian v. Peter, 561 F.Supp.2d 559, 565 (E.D.Va. 2008). Virginia has codified
the "choice-of-law" rule, also called lex loci delicti rule. In short, this means that the law of
the place of the wrong applies. An example of this and a good synopsis of the law appears in
PBM Products, LLC v Mead Johnson Nutrition Co., 678 F.Supp.2d 390, 398 (E.D.Va. 2009).
19. Id. at 561.
20. John Crank, Watchman and Community: Myth and Institutionalization in
Policing, 28 LAW & Soc. REV. 325, 336 (1994).
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A. The Annenberg Libel Reform Proposal
While the focus of this work is on the community aspect of defa-
mation, a brief overview of the attempts to reform the tort and the
suggestions which have been proffered assist in contextualizing the is-
sue. Defamation law has been the subject of at least one
comprehensive review by legal scholars and academics, who railed
against the current legal structure of defamation. The most compre-
hensive contemporary work on reform is the Annenberg Libel Reform
Proposal (ALRP), released in 1988.21 Rodney Smolla, one of the collab-
orators of the Annenberg proposal, published an article describing
what the ALRP entailed and why it represents a necessary starting
point for any proposed reformation of defamation law. 2 2 Beginning
with the premise that a "society starting from scratch to design the
'perfect' legal mechanism for handling libel disputes would never ar-
rive at the current system," the writers of the ALRP specifically
stressed the need to address the time consuming, inefficient, and costly
process to determine, as well as the ineffectiveness of, damages to
properly address harms. 23 Shockingly, in a proposed large-scale over-
haul of defamation law, no proposed reformation of the community
standard or definition was mentioned.
Written in the form of comprehensive model statutes, the ALRP
recommends a three-stage approach to resolve defamation disputes
which would completely remodel the law of defamation.24 Stages I and
II of the ALRP focus on the problems of cost, inefficiency, and delay
inherent in defamation actions. By imposing forceful retraction provi-
sions, streamlined statutes of limitation in which plaintiffs can bring
action, endorsing fee-shifting provisions and enlarging the applicabil-
ity of declaratory judgments, the proposal forcefully attacks key issues
21. Northwestern University Libel Reform Project, Annenberg Washington Program in
Communications Policy Studies, Proposal for the Reform of Libel Law: The Report of the
Libel Reform Project of the Annenberg Washington Program Annenberg Washington
Program [in] COMMUNICATIONS POLICY STUDIES, Northwestern University, 1988).
22. Rodney A. Smolla and Michael J. Gaertner, The Annenberg Libel Reform Proposal:
The Case for Enactment, 31 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 25, 26 (1989).
23. Id. at 31.
24. Id. at 31 (Smolla's scathing indictment of the current system prefacing the three-
stage reform approach the ALRP endorses states: "It is costly, cumbersome, and fails to
vindicate either free speech values or the protection of reputation. Enormous defense costs
of protracted litigation exert a chilling effect on the press, while plaintiffs are left with no
meaningful legal remedy for reputational injury. Libel suits tend to drag on interminably,
are enormously costly for both sides, and very rarely end in a clear-cut resolution of what
ought to be the heart of the matter: a determination of the truth or falsity of what was
published."
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which, if adopted, may rectify key issues. 25 Smolla does admit that the
reforms outlined in these stages result in the defendant losing the "pro-
tection of constitutional fault requirements of negligence or actual
malice, as the case may be."2 6 It is my contention that a removal of a
defendant's constitutional rights renders the proposals outlined by the
ALRP committee completely impractical. While the well-written
model statutes highlight potential aspects which need improvement
and represent a well-reasoned attempt to remedy several of the ail-
ments which plague defamation, there is little to no chance of the
Constitution being amended in such a manner as to allow individual
protections to be discarded.
Despite the above limitations, the ALRP is not without some
promising suggestions. Universally requiring negligence as a floor in
all cases, eliminating presumed and punitive damages, and presump-
tively classifying "certain genres of speech, such as editorials, letters to
the editor, editorial cartoons, reviews, parody, satire and fiction" as
opinion have inherent benefits in many cases. 27 In attempting a large-
scale reformation of the entire tort, however, these solutions seem out-
weighed by many problems. It forces the plaintiff to be aware of the
laws and act swiftly, setting a 30-day statute of limitations in which to
bring a complaint lest the suit be barred. 28 This can be especially prob-
lematic where the defamatory effects or discovery of the offense is not
immediately discovered. It also allows either party, plaintiff or defen-
dant, to opt to file for a declaratory judgment, an act which forecloses
monetary recovery for a deserving plaintiff, save the possibility of at-
torneys' fees. 29 In sum, massive problems emerge when the focus is
placed on improving the efficiency, reducing the time and cost and re-
building ineffective laws that govern defamation. I propose that the
ALRP, while necessary to understand the current landscape of defama-
tion reformation, misses the mark by not re-focusing on defining the
community and re-defining the tort of defamation within it. Clarifying
and reassessing the community standard looms as the most viable
method of exacting meaningful reform within a troubled system.
25. Id. at 32-34.
26. Id. at 33.
27. Id. at 34-35.
28. Id. at 32-33.
29. Id. at 35-36.
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B. Focusing on the Community
One contemporary post-ALRP work that has explored the con-
cept of reforming the community is Lyrissa Lidsky's work "Defamation,
Reputation and the Myth of Community."30 Lidsky's article focuses on
the harm to reputation and the effect of the alleged defamation upon
those who "make up the plaintiffs 'community,"' rather than the effect
of the harm upon the individual plaintiff.3 1 In the nascent stages of a
defamation action, therefore, the judge or decision-maker "must first
select the community in whose esteem the plaintiff has been dimin-
ished."32 In a modern world where modes of communication are
exponentially enlarged, new forums and marketplaces emerge daily.
Within this world, the sheer number of sub-communities is growing
exponentially. It's simply not plausible to expect a judge to adequately
or accurately determine a relevant community in a large number of
defamation cases.
Beginning again with the Supreme Court's standard from Peck
articulating an "important and respectable" minority, courts must then
consider the Restatement (Second) of Torts' requirement that a state-
ment lower the plaintiffs standing in the eyes of a "substantial and
respectable minority" of the community.33 Overall, the evaluation a
court must undertake is arduous. Lidsky points out that in applying
this standard, courts are required to first undertake a quantitative in-
quiry to show a "substantial" portion of the community was affected,
and second a normative inquiry is needed to determine whether or not
the group is "respectable."3 4 An example of the "substantial and re-
spectable minority" standard being applied is found in the Florida
Supreme Court's holding in Rapp v. Jews for Jesus.35 Edith Rapp, a
woman of traditional Jewish faith, argued that a newsletter and web-
site's comments that she had accepted some Christian teachings would
injure her reputation in the eyes of "like-minded" religious practition-
ers. The Florida Supreme Court held that the statements must be
evaluated from the standpoint of a "substantial and respectable minor-
ity," the court forestalled Edith Rapp's potential recovery for
30. Lidsky, supra note 3, at 7-8.
31. Id. at 6.
32. Id. at 6-7.
33. Peck v. Tribune, 214 U.S. 185, 190 (1909).; Restatement (Second) of Torts §559 cmt.
e (1977).
34. Lidsky, supra note 3, at 7.
35. Rapp v. Jews for Jesus, 944 So.2d 460, 465 (Fla. App. 2006).
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reputational harm among "like-minded" traditional Jewish
practitioners.36
Just as the judge must impossibly determine the relevant com-
munity in which harm to a plaintiffs reputation must be shown, the
judge must somehow undertake the above dual quantitative and nor-
mative inquiries to determine whether the group they identify can
truly be said to be a community. At least one scholar, Larissa Lidsky,
has cast a dubious light on this approach. Lidsky states that the judi-
cial phenomenon and arbitrary determination of community is based
on "intuitive judgments" which are never articulated and are labeled
as "common knowledge" or "common sense" by the finder of fact.37 Ad-
ding to the complexity facing a tribunal in making the determination of
the relevant community is the wide cultural diversity present in mod-
ern America.
America is a melting pot which cannot be accurately depicted as
a homogenous society with consistent values and norms. Built as a
conglomeration of immigrants from different nations throughout
American history, many cultural and social norms are transported
from abroad. Today, American culture is seemingly so diverse that it
may be rare to find many individual values, past perhaps those which
govern and restrict the basest and most hideous wrongs, which would
permeate equally throughout communities. Communities are not stan-
dardized, are not shaped equally, and do not hold the same values from
which a "benchmark for determining what statements are defamatory"
can be drawn.38 It is true that what scarcely raises an eyebrow within
one community may set another aflame. One contemporary example of
this phenomenon occurred when Florida Marlins manager Ozzie Guil-
len made comments praising Fidel Castro's longevity, comments which
registered strong reactions among the particular and small community
of Cuban-Americans. The resulting firestorm resulted in Guillen's un-
paid suspension as manager.39
This wide variance in community norms, coupled with the diffi-
culty of identifying and evaluating communities, creates a situation in
which novel approaches to reform are needed. Moreover, what is the
impact of ignoring the vantage point of the plaintiff, the individual who
may be in the best position to determine accurately and knowingly
36. Id. at 465.
37. See Lidsky, supra note 3, at 7-8.
38. Id. at 8.
39. Steven Wine, Ozzie Guillen Suspended by Marlins for Fidel Castro Comments,
HUFFINGTON POST (April 10, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/10/ozzie-guillen-
suspended-fidel-castro-marlins-n_1414666.html.
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what the community is, in favor of a judicial determination? 40 Al-
lowing plaintiffs themselves to plead and prove the community in
which the harm is apparent may allow for the judicial process to
achieve a greater degree of stability. The concept of plaintiffs pleading
and proving their own community, or a "plaintiff-centered" approach,
is more fully developed by Sanders in her article "Defining Defamation:
Community in the Age of the Internet."41 Allowing a plaintiff to plead
and prove his own relevant community allows small sub-communities
to achieve recognition, provided they can meet the substantial and re-
spectable minority criteria.4 2 This would potentially allow the plaintiff
to overcome the "injustice of forcing a plaintiff to accept the community
the court chooses" and escape a scenario where "fact-sensitive, ad hoc
decisions are the norm."43
Support for professional or other subgroups, or at the least re-
jection of a need for a national community, has already been
recognized.44 The D.C. Circuit utilized this approach in Afro-American
Publishing Co. v Jaffe, a 1966 case in which a white male was called a
"bigot" in a "black newspaper."45 Here, the court relied on a standard
based on the publication's location and the "average reader" within the
range of the publication or "target community" as opposed to the na-
tional standard. The D.C. Circuit reiterated this approach in
Tavoulareas v. Piro46, a 1987 case where an oil company president
sued the Washington Post over allegedly defamatory comments. The
court in Tavoulareas held that the publication must be "read and con-
strued in the sense in which readers to whom it is addressed would
ordinarily understand it."47 This case is another example of the courts,
in a media case, determining community in defamation actions based
on a "target audience."
While there are appreciable benefits to the plaintiff-centered
approach, there is also a substantial downside. A member of the media
40. Id. at 22. Lidsky concludes that the "court ignores the views of the community and
instead constructs a "general community by fiat."
41. Sanders, supra note 15, at 262. Sanders builds on Lidsky's idea, and does
especially well to move the concept into a post-internet focus which Lidsky did not
contemplate in her 1996 article.
42. Peck v. Tribune, 214 U.S. 185, 190 (1909).
43. Sanders, supra note 15, at 245, 251, 257. (See, e.g., Tavoulareas v Piro, 817 F.2d
762 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Afro-American Pub. v Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1966)).
44. See Time v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453-54 (1976). In this case, the court
examined Firestone's prominence in the Palm Beach, Florida community.
45. See Jaffe, supra note 43, at 658.
46. See Tavoulareas, supra note 43, at 780.
47. Id.
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or other individual may chill their speech to avoid repercussions of
speech in communities never intended to be reached by the speech.
Subjecting an author to a potential defamation suit from an unforesee-
able plaintiff may outweigh the positive aspects of accurately defining
the community and enhancing the certainty of potential punish-
ments. 48 In redefining and reforming the concept of community within
the tort of defamation, the plaintiff-centered approach would need to
be regulated in order to avoid these potential pitfalls, or perhaps
emerge as a piece of a larger community structure.
Lidsky's article attacks the "contemporary" defamation stan-
dard, which is to say that she limits her scope to consideration of
defamation suits within traditional geographic and communal set-
tings.49 A look at modern reformation works may prove more apt to
generate solutions. Amy Sanders looks exclusively at the post-Internet
age of communication, attempting to redefine community by consider-
ing more recent and "cutting-edge" Internet cases.5 0 Looking at the
common factors courts have used in recent Internet jurisprudence to
define community provides insight to reforming the definition of com-
munity. Acknowledging where the courts have placed weight and what
factors they have stressed provides a baseline from which to isolate
successes and failures within the current system.
C. The Targeted Community
From 1966 until the 1990's, the geographic approach was "dom-
inant in defining the boundaries of community."5 1  Under the
geographic approach, the court looks at the reputational harm a plain-
tiff suffered in the community where the plaintiff lives, or the harm
suffered within the publication's target community. 52 With the advent
of the Internet, one can see the pitfalls inherent in any approach based
on the geographic approach as a sole determinant of community. Per-
haps the largest problem with the geographic approach is the fact that
48. Sanders, supra note 15, at 263.
49. See Lidsky, supra note 3, at ? January 1996 work focuses on attacking the "myth"
that a community even exists in America, and did not address the nascent internet
movement, and it would be asking too much to expect her to have foreseen the great impact
the internet has had upon our communication.
50. Sanders, supra note 15, at 231.
51. Sanders, supra note 15, at 246. See also Afro. Am. Pub. Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649,
54-55 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (defining community to include either the location of the publication
or a professional community based on occupation); Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762, 780
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (same) (quoting Jaffe, 366 F.2d at 654).
52. See Sanders, supra note 15, at 246.
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in a modern world, one's community is less frequently determined by
geographic proximity. For instance, online gaming, forums, blogs and
more unite those with commonalities from any corner of the globe.
With the flaws of the geographic approach becoming more visi-
ble, some courts have instead focused on membership within a
particular group, slowly drifting away from the location of the publica-
tion or target community as the determinative factors.5 3 As Sanders
states, "[gliven the potential for the Internet to unite people across
traditional geographic boundaries, it is not surprising that group mem-
bership has been used as a proxy for community in several online
defamation cases." 54 Even pre-Internet, this idea has surfaced as often
the focus has shifted to sub-communities. These sub-communities may
focus on occupation, professional affiliation, or language, but the lim-
ited discussions of community in online defamation cases have not
greatly enlarged the scope of potential communities.55
An example of the restriction on the potential scope of online
cases can be seen in Condit v. Dunne.5 6 In 2004, California Congress-
man Gary Condit filed a defamation claim over comments published by
Entertainment Tonight Online, which was based in New York. The
court was forced to decide whether to apply California law, the location
of Condit and the injury, or New York law, based on the place the alleg-
edly defamatory material was published.5 7 Condit claimed that the
injury was nationwide, and that the court should enlarge the commu-
nity to encompass the scope of his reputational harm, but the court
eschewed this designation, restricting the judgment to the location of
the party's domiciles and the locus of the court. In doing so, the court
seems to reason that even where statements are published nationally,
and harm occurs nationally, injuries are still redressed within a geo-
53. See Sharratt v. Hous. Innovations, Inc., 310 N.E.2d 343, 346 (Mass. 1974)
(identifying community and isolating reputational harm to the architecture profession);
Reiman v. Pac. Dev. Soc'y 284 P. 575, 578 (Ore. 1930) (identifying the community and
isolating the reputational harm to Finnish speaking individuals in Oregon).
54. Sanders, supra note 15, at 248. To illustrate her point, Sanders relied on research
that "as of 2010, the Southern Poverty Law Center had identified 888 organized hate groups
in the U.S." Southern Poverty Law Center, Stand Strong Against Hate, www.splcenter.org/
center/petitions/standstrong/ (last visited June 14, 2008). She also looked at the online
gaming community Second Life, a site that allows users to create virtual identities,
reporting "a 'resident population' of nearly fourteen million by 2008. Second Life,
Frequently Asked Questions, second-life.com/whatis/faq.php (last visited June 14, 2008).
55. See McNally v. Yarnell, 764 F.Supp. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (discussion of sub-
community of artists); Remick, supra note 12, at 248 (2001 case involving professional
affiliation in boxing community); Reiman v. Pac. Dev. Soc. et. al., 284 P. 575 (Ore. 1930)
(constructing community based on common language).
56. Condit v. Dunne, 317 F.Supp. 2d 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
57. Id.
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graphically bound community standard. More to the point, the New
York court determined that it was more important to protect the plain-
tiffs reputation in the locale where it likely suffered the greatest harm,
California.58 Maneuvering to utilize the court located where the al-
leged injury was suffered does help to protect the plaintiff in their
community, if we continue to qualify community geographically. Un-
fortunately, when considering modern Internet defamation cases,
giving flexibility to which community should govern does little where
the reputation of the congressman was injured nationally.
Another example of this flawed approach is illustrated in Rapp,
where Florida's court employed the "common mind" or "respectable mi-
nority" standard under which the appellate court found a reasonable
person in the target audience would interpret the statements in a
favorable light.59 By looking at the targeted community, the court un-
dertook an analysis similar to that which would have been undertaken
in print cases such as Jaffe, a case decided 50 years previously. Much
like the injury suffered by Congressman Condit, the injury to the
plaintiffs reputation exceeded the scope of the defined community.
Rapp was injured in the eyes of her peers, and her injury was given no
redress. The basic problem found in Condit, Rapp, and Jaffe is that
the targeted community is not necessarily the community in which the
plaintiff suffers his injury. To redress the potential shortcomings
which a judicially imposed community standard provides a plaintiff,
Sanders puts forth three possible rubrics which could be utilized to re-
form the definition of community and improve defamation actions
effectiveness.6 0
The rubrics Sanders suggests are the plaintiff-centered ap-
proach, the mixed methods approach, which utilizes several factors
such as plaintiff location and place of publication to redefine the old
geographic approach courts have used in the past, as well as the spe-
cific community approach which identifies sub-communities within the
general population.61 An idea first introduced in a traditional print
context by Lidsky, the plaintiff centered approach was discussed
above. One might consider the plight of Edith Rapp, attempting to
prove the community her injury was sustained within and being de-
nied as the court considered the overall message was favorable, despite
58. Id. at 354; see Sanders, supra note 15, at 256 for further discussion on Condit and
the potential applicability to communal reformation, defining community in terms of where
the greatest injury occurred.
59. See Rapp, supra note 35, at 465.
60. Sanders, supra note 15, at 15-17.
61. Id. at 260.
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being quite detrimental from her vantage point and among those she
intimately associated with.62 Sanders' evaluation of the specific com-
munity concept of identifying sub-communities within the general
population shows this approach has enjoyed a limited success. In Rem-
ick, the specific community approach was utilized to isolate the
professional boxing community, determining that this group was deter-
minative in assessing the plaintiffs harm. As noted by Lidsky,
however, courts have been reticent to identify groups that "challenge
social norms."63
While offering potential enhanced predictability and protection
to parties in defamation actions, and possibly creating easily identifi-
able groups with clear normative structures, there are drawbacks to
the specific community approach. The likelihood of a plaintiff being a
public figure, and having the court by necessity apply the absolute
malice standard to the claim, increases when the community is
shrunk. Also, the potential chilling effect of authors closing off commu-
nication to ensure it only reaches an audience who will not be offended
could result. Lastly, uniformity would be difficult, as courts would
need to agree on specific criteria from which to determine small and
discrete communities.64
D. Reform Within the Homosexual Community
One last approach to redefining the community within defama-
tion claims was postulated by Abigail Rury's work looking at methods
of restructuring the community standard within homosexual cases.65
Rury premised her article on findings that "the community standard,
as it is currently used, is not an accurate reflection of society's values
when litigating. . .defamation cases," and contends that the courts
should be required to identify and articulate the community standard
being applied.6 6 Articulation would have many benefits, including in-
creased transparency reducing potential judicial biases, enhanced
fairness for the plaintiff who will not be judged by some fictional or
"idealized" community standard, and a semblance of equity extends to
62. See Rapp, supra note 35, at 465; see also Lidsky, supra note 3, at 22; see pages 14-
15 of this article.
63. Lidsky, supra note 3, at 7-8.
64. Sanders, supra note 15, at 261. Sanders concisely discusses these specific pratfalls,
but does not endeavor to link her variant approaches together.
65. Abigail Rury, He's So Gay. . .Not That There's Anything Wrong With That, 17
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 655, 657 (2011).
66. Id. at 657. Rury argues that courts can use polls, legislation, case law, or testimony
to identify a relevant community standard, and include this analysis within the decision.
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all parties where the same standards which determine our individual
interactions govern the litigation.6 7
Rury also considers applying the average contemporary person
standard used in obscenity law, opining that this would create a more
uniform standard for deciding what constitutes defamation. 68 The Su-
preme Court delineated the "average contemporary person" obscenity
standard in Miller v. California. The Miller standard is a three-part
test which asks: (a) whether an "average person, applying contempo-
rary [local] community standards find [s] that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest"; (b)"whether the work depicts
or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct," as defined by
the state law; and (c) whether the work in question "lacks serious liter-
ary, artistic, political, or scientific value."69 In contrast to defamation's
vague communal standard and wide variance in judicial holdings,
when considering obscenity the court in Miller stated that there is no
national community standard, describing such a standard as "hypo-
thetical and unascertainable."7 0
In analyzing Rury's ideas, she is correct to point out that ob-
scenity and homosexuality may make "strange bedfellows."7 1
Certainly those in the homosexual community would not consider their
sexuality obscene. There are some binding ties between the two cate-
gories however, and Rury aptly links the two concepts:
Although defamation and obscenity do not seem to have much in
common at first blush, the adjudication of whether the false impu-
tation of homosexuality is defamatory and obscenity law are both
rooted in sexuality. Homosexuality and obscenity imply certain sex-
ual behaviors. Although vastly different, both defamation and
obscenity law share a focus on community standards. Because of
the inherent overlap between subject matter and the societal mea-
sure of what is deemed prurient or harmful to reputation, obscenity
law's community standard should be used in defamation cases. 72
Part of the rationale of linking homosexuality and obscenity
seems to stem from traditional stereotypes regarding homosexuality.7 3
67. Id.
68. Id. at 668; Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
69. See Miller, supra note 66, at 24.
70. Id. at 30-31.
71. Rury, supra note 63, at 657.
72. Rury, supra note 63, at 675-676.
73. Some courts have held that calling a person gay was defamatory, while other courts
have not. Albright v. Morton, a 2004 Federal District Court case in Massachusetts, held that
the imputation of homosexuality does not constitute defamation per se. Albright v. Morton,
321 F. Supp. 2d 130, 136 (D. Mass. 2004); In Stern v. Cosby, a 2009 New York Federal
126
2012 REDEFINING DEFAMATION LAW'S STANDARD
In addition to the sex-based connection, the prejudicial and common
"deviancy" inherent with both obscenity and homosexuality are unique
to these fields. Current works on allegedly defamatory homosexual im-
putations argue, alternatively, that a per se defamatory label applied
to an accusation of homosexuality either affords protection for the ho-
mosexual community or legitimizes and validates a societal stigma
applied to a label one is "gay."74 The latter view, endorsed by Bunker,
Shenkman and Tobin in their 2011 article Not That There's Anything
Wrong With That, adds credence to the common level of "deviancy"
some communities within our large society may place on homosexual
conduct. A clear link between obscenity and homosexual defamation
suits becomes more clearly visible in this light. Nevertheless, while
certain logic applies in linking obscenity to homosexuality within a de-
famatory litigation setting, what about the vast majority of potential
group, sub-groups or minorities which are non-sexually based? The
link appears more attenuated in a setting with there is no stereotypical
negative connotation, and as such may not be a relevant standard for
communal groups such as engineers, athletes, or online journalists.
III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
"In effect, to follow, not to force the public inclination; to give a direc-
tion, a form, a technical dress, and a specific sanction, to the general
sense of the community, is the true end of legislature."
- Edmund Burke7 5
The preceding sections have offered widely varying suggestions
which endeavor to fix fundamental problems within the tort of defama-
tion. Defining community, or defining in whose eyes a plaintiffs
reputation suffers, is a threshold analysis to any defamation jurispru-
dence, and even in this preliminary analysis, courts fail to find
congruence. Compelling reasons for this failure are summed up by
Smolla and Gaertner in their article expounding upon the Annenberg
Report:
District Court case, the court held that falsely identifying a person as a homosexual does not
constitute defamation per se. Stern v. Cosby, 645 F. Supp. 2d 258, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
74. Robert D. Richards, Gay Labeling and Defamation Law: Have Attitudes Toward
Homosexuality Changed Enough to Modify Representational Torts? 18 COMM. L.
CONSPEcTus 349 (2009); Matthew D. Bunker, Drew E. Shenkman, Charles D. Tobin, Not
That There's Anything Wrong With That: Imputations of Homosexuality and the Normative
Structure of Defamation Law, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA. & ENTERTAINMENT. L.J.
581 (2010).
75. Letter from Edmund Burke to the Sheriffs of Bristol (Apr. 4, 1777), http://www.
brainyquote.com/quotes/keywords/community.html.
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A society starting from scratch to design the "perfect" legal mecha-
nism for handling libel disputes would never arrive at the current
system. It is costly, cumbersome, and fails to vindicate either free
speech values or the protection of reputation. Enormous defense
costs of protracted litigation exert a chilling effect on the press,
while plaintiffs are left with no meaningful legal remedy for reputa-
tional injury. Libel suits tend to drag on interminably, are
enormously costly for both sides, and very rarely end in a clear cut
resolution of what ought to be the heart of the matter: a determina-
tion of the truth or falsity of what was published.76
Here, Smolla states what I feel is an obvious fact; the system of
laws and standards that have risen to govern defamation are irregular,
unpredictable, vague and often arbitrary. A system with inherent un-
certainties harms both plaintiffs and defendants. Additionally, it is
the reason why the reformation ideas discussed above vary so widely.
Starting anew would pose significant constitutional problems, as the
constitutional protections recognized by the Supreme Court stand as
intractable pillars in not only the realm of defamation, but also
speech.77 Like it or not - or more aptly put whether or not the task is
achievable - reformers are left to operate within the existing system to
bring positive change to defamation actions.
A. Intra-Group Approach
Beginning first with an insular and contained "intra-group" def-
amation action, or defamation actions by one member of an identifiable
community against another member of the same community, we see
that a unique opportunity exists. For actions where both parties are
members of an identifiable group, such as a particular occupation, as
discussed in Remick or McNally, clearly defining communal standards,
and perhaps even communal punishments, becomes possible.78 With a
clear definition, parties know what can and cannot be published and
run little risk of defaming another individual. More importantly,
should they cross the clear threshold, it would be clearly identified and
a punishment may be predicted.
While this is limited to "intra-group" cases, where applicable, it
would reduce chilling of speech, as publishers act within their own
76. Smolla and Gaertner, supra note 22, at 32.
77. Sullivan, supra note 2, at 270. In New York Times v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court
superimposed first amendment protections upon the common law in order to guarantee that
the libel system provided sufficient breathing space for the tradition of "'uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open" speech.
78. See Remick, supra note 17, at 249; see McNally, supra note 53, at 838.
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community and the limits are clearly identified and known. It would
also heighten efficiency, expedite claims, and provide more equity.
Could the court effectively isolate small, insular sub-communities and
define limits and clarify punishments? Could these sub-communities
grow to include online gaming and social media forums? These are the
questions facing modern defamation jurisprudence. By starting with
redefining the community, much progress towards necessary reform
can be made by the courts. The trick will be how to best expand a
workable approach such as outlined in this section to the much larger
communal scope of defamation
B. Combining the "Specific Community" and "Plaintiff-
Centered" approaches
Standing alone, the idea put forth by Sanders, reforming defa-
mation's community standard via a "specific community" approach
potentially creates easily identifiable groups with clear normative
structures. This approach offers certain advantages, such as offering
potentially enhanced predictability and protection to parties in defa-
mation actions. However, these are outweighed by the two largest
drawbacks to this approach. First, there is the potential chilling effect
on communication.79 Creating numerous and particularized groups
which apply a uniquely tailored scope of community to defamatory
communication, leaves an author in a perilous position. Unsure of
which groups will receive the message, an author is tempted to shield
himself by closing off communication to all except a "target" audience,
thereby ensuring no offending result. Lastly, uniformity would be dif-
ficult, as courts would need to agree on specific criteria from which to
determine small and discrete communities.
The second potential drawback to the specific community ap-
proach is the lack of uniformity among courts and jurisdictions in their
creation of sub-groups.80 To fully effectuate this concept alone, courts
would need to agree on specific criteria from which to determine small
and discrete communities in order to deter forum shopping and in-
crease equity. Legal uniformity is improved when the specific
community approach is merged with the plaintiff centered approach.
In the plaintiff centered approach outlined by Lidsky, the plaintiff is
allowed to plead and prove his or her own community.81 By identifying
clearly the boundaries of the plaintiffs community and allowing courts
79. Sanders, supra note 15, at 261.
80. Id.
81. Lidsky, supra note 3, at 22.
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to affirm the standards by which defamatory communication within
the particular group is measured, authors can clearly adjudge whether
their speech is likely to be defamatory.
By way of example, consider the homosexual community Rury
used in her article, where she postulated that a courts' clear articula-
tion of the plaintiffs community heightens both transparency and
equity.8 2 Identifying a specific community has legitimate benefits and
the courts' articulation of their analysis does provide a more realistic
semblance of community. Using familiar standards to determine indi-
vidual interactions gives larger certainty. But homosexuality is a large
group with many variants, and no two communities can realistically be
believed to operate in exactly the same way, with common social mores
and standards of conduct. What of a homosexual male in Nebraska
compared to a lesbian in New York City? Consider a gay individual
working in a public school, or perhaps a prominent politician. It is
common sense to believe that the communities in which these individu-
als live and operate are drastically different. The concept of clear
articulation can be taken further and operate more effectively when
combined with a plaintiff-centered approach which allows the plaintiff
to plead and prove her own community. The judge can then determine
empirically what the standards within the proffered community are by
using polls, legislation, testimony, or any other relevant information.
Critics of this approach may point to the prohibitive costs, both
in time and money. They argue that requesting the trier-of-fact clearly
articulate the boundaries of the relevant community would impose
upon the legal system. However, where the judge is already issuing a
written verdict, it would not require an excessive amount of time to
merely include the boundaries that the judge considered. It is neces-
sary for the judge to formulate a communal boundary within a
defamation action, and then assess whether or not reputational harm
occurred within this community. Simply asking a judge to "show their
work" imposes a minimal burden. Moreover, improving the trans-
parency within an amorphous tort and potentially reducing ancillary
chilling effects on author's who are unclear of defamatory boundaries
amply offsets this minimal increase in time and cost. It is hard to envi-
sion a more practical method of increasing clarity than a judicial
explanation of the community in which reputational harm was alleged.
82. Rury, supra note 63, at 657.
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C. Borrowing the Obscenity Standard
Perhaps the plaintiff-centered approach to redefining the com-
munity within defamation actions can borrow from obscenity case law.
The standard the court stated in Miller, the average contemporary per-
son, has relevance. 83 By allowing a plaintiff to plead and prove his own
community, and evaluating the allegations of injury to the plaintiffs
reputation under a reasonable person standard as stated in Miller, it
seems more likely a court may more accurately evaluate the injury
with more precision under a "contemporary community standard". Of
course, obscenity carries with it a certain stigma among many commu-
nities, and as such a reasonable person standard is perhaps more
applicable where there is a negative connotation attached, and less rel-
evant when considering communities where there is no preconceived
biases or attachments. Nevertheless, defamation law as currently
codified would be greatly improved should it choose to apply a "contem-
porary community standard" approach that measures the community
through the eyes of the "reasonable person."
Taking for example Peck v. Tribune Company, where the court
held that it is sufficient for defamation claims to have injured the
plaintiff "in the estimation of a substantial and respectable class of the
community."84 In applying this standard, a trier-of-fact must first de-
duce a quantifiable percentage or fraction which makes the community
a "substantial" minority. After this evaluation, the court must then
identify and determine whether or not this community is "respectable."
By being required to show injury to an individual to a "substantial and
respectable" portion of the community, the judge must undergo two
evaluations, both of which are vague and ambiguous.85 Applying in-
stead the contemporary community standard, which looks at the
defamation through the eyes of the "reasonable person," the judge need
undertake only one evaluation. Moreover, the determination which the
judge must make is more flexible. Harder and more ambiguous deter-
minations of whether or not enough of the population agree as to make
the portion "substantial" are left by the wayside. All that the judge,
and for that matter the parties involved, need to be focused on is
whether or not a reasonable person at the time and place the alleged
defamation took place would find this conduct acceptable.
Defamation law needs an evolution. Changing the way we
think about defamatory conduct is essential in a modern world. Indi-
83. See Miller, supra note 66, at 24.
84. Elizabeth Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 190 (1909).
85. Id.
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viduals from different cultures, separated by oceans and reared in
vastly different cultural communities, are interacting instantaneously
through public forums. When assessing whether or not the communi-
cations between the parties are defamatory, the law must begin to
reflect this massive evolution in communication. By identifying and
focusing on a "contemporary community standard" based on reasona-
bleness, the courts can go a long way towards providing injured
plaintiffs equity in the eyes of the law.
